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CASENOTE
Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish
Commission v. Flotilla, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the greatest impediment to the future passage of
environmental regulations is their conflict with the Fifth Amendment
takings clause. Environmental legislation often regulates the way in
which landowners use their property, which, in turn, leads to takings
issues. This casenote focuses on Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish
Commission v. Flotilla, Inc.' and its treatment of takings issues in the
context of environmental regulations. An analysis of Flotilla provides
insight into Fifth Amendment issues because it not only involves a typical
situation where takings issues arise, but also involves a temporary
invasion of a property owner's rights, a characteristic which raises
interesting takings issues. For example, how likely is it that a landowner
could demonstrate that he was deprived of substantial economic use of
his property sufficient to justify compensation when the restrictions of the
use of his property were only temporary? Such a question serves to
emphasize the relative difficulty property owners have in obtaining
compensation for restrictions on their property rights.
This casenote also discusses other takings cases involving
environmental regulations which restricted landowners' property rights
in slightly different ways. These cases, along with Flotilla, illustrate the
grievances of landowners who were deprived of partial use of their
properties in various ways, but who received no compensation for the
limitation on the use of their property rights. Finally, the casenote turns
to various proposals for reform in takings law, including a discussion of
partial takings.
If opposition to environmental regulations is to subside, either
legislators or the courts must alleviate the tension between private
landowners' property rights and restrictions that environmental regulations place on those rights. Unfortunately, there appears to be no
cost-effective and viable solution to the problems with current takings
law. As takings law in the context of environmental legislation stands,
private landowners are sometimes forced to bear a substantial burden for
the successful implementation of regulations. Dissatisfaction among

1. 636 So.2d 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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private landowners translates into serious obstacles in the enactment of
environmental laws.
II. FACTS
FloridaGame and Fresh Water Fish Commission v. Flotilla,Inc. concerns
a dispute over a developer's use of its property.2 In September 1984,
Flotilla Inc. purchased 173 acres for residential subdivision development.3
After conducting environmental impact studies and receiving city approval
to begin construction, the company proceeded with its plans. Six months
after construction began, however, the company discovered a bald eagle's
nest. Soon afterwards, in response to an anonymous tip, the Florida Game
and Fresh Water Fish Commission (the "Commission") began investigating
the site for possible criminal violations of state and federal bald eagle
habitat preservation statutes. The Commission ordered the property
evacuated, but Flotilla continued construction. The company did, however,
stop construction within 750 feet of the eagle's nest, after being threatened
with criminal prosecution. The Commission eventually set up another 750
foot buffer zone around a second nest that was found on the property. The
Commission created these buffer zones pursuant to the Endangered Species
Act and Florida's Endangered and Threatened Species Act of 1977.4
Flotilla had organized its construction project into six phases.
Centex Homes ("Centex") purchased phases one and two of the project
before the second nest was found. Centex then inquired as to whether it
could purchase phases five and six and complete its development plans in
lieu of the Commission's restrictions. It eventually purchased both phases
five and six. Once the eagles abandoned the land on phase four, Centex also
purchased that property. Flotilla, then, was able to sell every phase to
private contractors, except for a 24 acre preserve on phase four. The prices
were, however, less than what the company had expected to receive.
Flotilla filed an inverse condemnation action against the
Commission and the City of Bradenton. The trial court found the
Commission liable for "taking" 48 acres and for construction delays
affecting the property's value. The District Court of Appeal of Florida held
that prohibiting development on certain portions of a tract of land is not an
unconstitutional taking. The court reasoned that Flotilla was not entitled to
compensation because the Commission's actions did not deprive the
company of substantial economic use of its property. The court recognized
protection of endangered species as being a valid exercise of the state's
police power, noting that the state's object was "generally beneficial to the
2. Id.
3. Id. at 763.
4. Id.
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welfare and quality of life of the people of the State of Florida."5
III. BACKGROUND
A. Fifth Amendment Takings
Two basic scenarios give rise to Fifth Amendment takings issues.
The first occurs when a government physically occupies a person's private
property; and the second occurs when a government regulates the use of
an owner's private property to such an extent that it deprives the land
owner of substantial economic use of his property.6 In the case of a
physical taking, the court must determine whether the physical occupation
permanently deprives the owner of the "bundle" of his property rights. The
Supreme Court in Loretto v. TeleprompterManhattanCATV Corp. identified
two key factors affecting the substance of these rights.7 These factors are (1)
an owner has the right to occupy the property for himself and to exclude
others from it; and (2) the owner has the right to control the use of the
property." When the government prevents an owner from exercising these
rights because it has physically occupied his property, the government
must compensate the landowner.
Determining when compensation is appropriate is more nebulous
where a temporary or regulatory action is involved. The action may, on one
hand, qualify as a valid exercise of police power, in which case no
compensation is necessary.
The exercise of the police power may necessarily diminish the
value or utility of private property in certain instances, the very essence of
the police power (as distinguished from the power of eminent domain) is
that the deprivation of individual rights and property without
compensation cannot prevent its operation, so long as its exercise is proper
and reasonable.'
On the other hand, the action may amount to a taking, requiring
compensation under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and similar provisions in most state constitutions." In Graham v.
EstuaryProperties,Inc., a land owner appealed the Florida Land and Water
Adjudicatory Commission's decision to deny approval for development of

5. Id.
6. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 US. 470, 485 (1987).
7. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982).
8. Id.
9. People v. Sakai Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 536, 541 (Cal. Ct.App. 1976).
10. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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a wetland-area." The Florida Supreme Court referred to six factors which
may facilitate the classification of a government action as either a valid
exercise of police power or a taking. Generally, these factors question the
nature and extent of the action: 1) whether there was a physical invasion of
the property; 2) whether its value has diminished; 3) whether the regulation
confers a public benefit or prevents a public harm; 4) whether it promotes
the health, safety, welfare, or morals of the public; 5) whether the regulation
is arbitrarily and capriciously applied; and 6) the extent to which the
regulation curtails investment-backed expectations. These factors do not
comprise a balancing test, but merely offer guidance to the courts in
making their determinations. 12
Courts have upheld the protection of the environment and, more
specifically, the preservation of wildlife as valid objects of the exercise of
state police powers. 3 That is not to say, however, that all government
regulatory actions involving environmental concerns automatically
preclude compensation to the property owner. The extent to which the
action impedes the owner's property rights is still relevant. Depending
upon the degree of the regulation's interference with the disposition of the
property, the owner may be entitled to compensation. 4
Typical areas where environmental legislation invokes a Fifth
Amendment analysis include where a landowner either seeks to engage
in activities on his land which would disturb an endangered or threatened species' habitat or seeks to harm an endangered or threatened
species in order to protect his own property. The following discussion
gives examples of specific conflicts that arose between wildlife protection
legislation and the Fifth Amendment takings clause. The cases cited are
representative of how the courts have upheld different restrictions to
private property owners' use of their land, including cases where the
court denied property owners compensation for loss in their land's value.
IV. TAKINGS AND PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
A.

Damage to Land

One area where courts have denied compensation is where
property owners have suffered damage to land. Mountain States Legal
Foundation v. Hodel5 is an example of this type of takings issue. That

11. Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So.2d 1374 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied sub nom.
Taylor v. Graham, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981).
12. Graham, 399 So. 2d at 1380-81.
13. See generally Graham, 399 So. 2d at 1374,
14. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon et aL, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
15. 799 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986).
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case concerns the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act. The Act
protects wild horses and burros from capture, branding, harassment, or
death. 6 In Mountain States, private property owners, the Mountain States
Legal Foundation and the Rock Springs Grazing Association (collectively,
"the Association"), brought suit on behalf of their members to force the
Secretary of the Interior to prevent the wild horses from roaming onto
their land. 7 The Association used the land for cattle grazing, but the
wild horses' grazing habits diminished the food available for the cattle.'
In addition to a writ of mandamus requiring the Secretary to
remove the horses from its land, the Association also sought $500,000 in
damages for an uncompensated taking. 9 The court held that damage
to the lands did not constitute an uncompensated taking despite the
land's diminished value." It also cited to other wildlife protection acts,
including the Endangered Species Act, which curtailed private property
owners' use of their land, in order to refute the Association's argument
that the horses were instrumentalities of the federal government, and as
such, constituted a permanent governmental occupation of the land that
warranted compensation. 2' The court used these Acts to show that the
Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act is a land-use regulation
designed to protect a particular species and that it is not "unique on its
impact on private resource owners. "22
The court also found that the Act did not interfere with the
Association's distinct investment-backed expectations of using its
property for grazing cattle, nor with its right to hold the property for
investment purposes.' Thus, because of the important governmental
interest involved-protecting the wild horses and burros-and the fact
that the court did not find (nor did the Association argue) that it was
deprived of all economically viable use of its property, the damage done
to its land was not an uncompensated taking.24

16. Id. at 1425.
17. Id. at 1424.
18. Id.at 1425. Under the Act, the Secretary of the Interior is responsible for managing
wild horses and burros.
19. Id. at 1424.
20. Id. at 1431.
21. Id. at 1427-28.

22. Id. at 1428.
23. Id. at 1431.
24. Id.
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B. Damage to Livestock
Another situation where takings issues arise is where a statutorily
protected species harms or kills livestock. In Christy v. Hodel,2 for
example, a livestock owner challenged the validity of the Endangered
Species Act ("ESA") because it prevented him from protecting his sheep
herds from grizzly bears. Under the ESA, it is a crime to take a grizzly
bear, yet the bears attacked Christy's sheep nightly. At one point, Christy
enlisted the help of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service to help
him capture the bears and remove them from his property.' During this
attempt, Christy shot and killed one bear, for which he had to pay a civil
penalty of $3,000.3 Eventually he was allowed to terminate his lease and
move his sheep elsewhere.' Before doing so, he lost a total of 84 sheep,
as did other sheep herders named as plaintiffs in the suit.29
The plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction preventing the
ESA's enforcement and a declaration that application of the ESA where
a landowner is defending his property is unconstitutional.3 In justifying
their Fifth Amendment claim, the plaintiffs argued that grizzly bears are
"agents of the government", because of their protected status, and that
they had physically taken the plaintiffs' property.3'
The court refused to recognize the plaintiffs' loss of sheep as a
taking, noting that the regulation itself did not take or regulate the land,
nor did it deprive the plaintiffs of their bundle of property rights.' In
refuting the plaintiffs' charge that the grizzly bears' conduct is attributable to the government, the court noted that "the federal government
does not 'own' the wild animals it protects, nor does the government
control the conduct of such animals. " '
C. Restrictions on Land Use
Regulatory takings issues may also occur when a landowner is
unable to use his property in certain ways. Flotilla falls into this category,
as does Graham v. Estuary Properties,Inc.' In Graham, the Supreme Court

25. 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989).
26. Christy, 857 F. 2d at 1326.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
(1981).

Id. at 1327.
Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1327.
Id.
Id. at 1334.
Id.
Id. at 1335.
399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Taylor v. Graham, 454 U.S. 1083
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of Florida upheld the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission's decision to prevent the development of a substantial portion of
wetland areas.' The area that Estuary Properties, Inc. ("Estuary") sought
to develop was populated by red and black mangroves and was
considered a sensitive ecological environment.' Estuary submitted a
development plan to the board of county commissioners, who then
presented it to the Southwest Florida Regional Planning Council.37 The
plan contemplated setting aside 2,800 acres of the red mangroves, and
destroying 1,800 acres of primarily black mangroves.' The Council
concluded that the plan would cause "the degradation of the waters of
Estero and San Carlos Bays" which would, in turn, affect the commercial
and sport fishing industries, resulting in a negative economic effect to Lee
County? Pursuant to the Council's recommendation, the board denied
the application for development approval and set forth 12 conditions that
would have to be met before development could be approved.'
Estuary appealed the order to the Florida Land and Water
Adjudicatory Commission, which upheld the denial of the development
approval. 4 Estuary then appealed that decision to the First District
Court of Appeals, which ordered that either Estuary be given permission
to develop the area or that Lee County institute condemnation proceedings on the mangrove area that it wished to protect. 42 Lee County
appealed.'
On appeal, Estuary argued that denial of development approval
constituted an uncompensated taking." The Florida Supreme Court
concluded, however, that "protection of environmentally sensitive areas
and pollution prevention" are valid exercises of the state's police
power.' The court did note that Estuary may still be entitled to compensation if the exercise of Florida's police power substantially reduced the
land's value.* This was not the case. Estuary was aware that portions
of the land were unsuitable for development when it purchased the
land.47 In addition, the court stated that just because Estuary was not

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

1374.
1376.
1376-77.
1377.

41. Id.
42. Id.

43. Id.
44. Id. at 1380.
45. Id. at 1381.
46. Id.

47. Id. at 1382.
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able to increase the value of the land by carrying out its building plans
does not mean that a taking occurred.' An owner does not have an
absolute right to alter his land as he wishes when that alteration is
contrary to the land's natural state or when it may injure others.'
VI. DISCUSSION
These examples illustrate several ways private property owners
suffer as a result of environmental regulations. In Flotilla,for instance, the
company was forced to alter some of its development plans. The Second
District Court of Appeals for Florida, however, correctly decided the case
according to current takings law. The Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish
Commission did not permanently and physically occupy the appellee's
land, but rather imposed restrictions upon the type of activity in which
it could engage. When the government imposes this type of restriction,
the court must decide whether the government's actions qualify as a valid
exercise of the police power, and if so, whether that exercise deprived the
landowner of substantial economic use of his property.
The Commission placed restrictions upon 48 acres of Flotilla's 173
acre parcel. These restrictions did not prevent Flotilla from using that
portion of the property, but mandated that Flotilla could not use it in a
way that would disturb the bald eagles' nesting areas. The District Court
of Appeals mentioned the six factors, discussed previously, in deciding
whether these restrictions constituted a valid exercise of Florida's police
power. The court concluded that the trial court correctly classified the
protection of environmentally endangered species as a valid exercise of
Florida's police power, noting that the state's object is one that is
"generally beneficial to the welfare and quality of life of the people of the
State of Florida."
In determining the extent of the Commission's interference with
Flotilla's development plans for its property, the court looked at what
Flotilla was actually able to do with the property. The company was able
to complete its plans with respect to three of the six phases of its project,
and was then able to find buyers for the remaining three.
Thus, in Flotilla, the burden on the landowner does not appear
great. Yet Flotilla illustrates the way in which a developer's property can
diminish in value because of an unforeseeable incident that has environmental significance-in this case, eagles nesting on the property. Flotilla's
problem, along with those of the landowners in the other cases cited,
raises the question of whether private landowners have a right to protect

48. Id.

49. Id.
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and use their properties to their fullest potential, and a right to expect
compensation when the government prevents them from doing so.
Unlike Estuary, Flotilla was not aware of the potential restrictions
on its property rights when it purchased the land. While the nature of the
bald eagles' presence on the property meant that the restrictions were
only temporary, their sporadic presence also meant that Flotilla was
unable to predict the upset to its development schedule. Therefore, even
when prospective landowners attempt to avoid conflict with environmental regulations when choosing a parcel of land for development, they may
still encounter takings problems.
The type of invasion in Flotilla,because it was only temporary, is
particularly bothersome to landowners since the courts are less likely to
determine that such restrictions deprive the landowner of significant
economic use of its property. After all, Flotilla could have developed its
property as it had originally intended once the eagles abandoned their
nests. This determination is despite the fact that companies like Flotilla
have a great economic interest in developing their property according to
their original plans. Real estate development is often market driven,
which means that timing is essential if a purchase is to generate its
projected profits. While the landowner may be able to develop its
property regardless of environmental regulations, it may still bear a
substantial economic loss due to market fluctuations. Such considerations
have spawned an interest in partial takings, which is discussed below.
VII. •PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Environmental regulations are essential to preserving wildlife, yet
their interference with property rights may lose them popular support.
One answer to the problem is for the legislature or the courts to broaden
their view of what constitutes a taking, which would result in the
government paying compensation to landowners affected by environmental regulations. While this would alleviate some of the burdens
environmental legislation places upon property owners, it would also be
extraordinarily expensive, and therefore impractical, for the government.
The Court recognized this problem early on in its dealings with
regulatory takings issues. Justice Holmes, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,' a seminal takings case, addressed this dilemma: "Government
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could
not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law. ,5 '

50. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
51. Id. at 413.
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PartialTakings

Another solution that some courts have examined is to compensate
owners for the amount that their property has diminished in value.
Previously, compensation was only found to be due if the property owner
lost substantial economic use of his property. Compensating a property
owner for the diminished value of his land is referred to as a partial taking.
A recent case out of Florida, FloridaRock Industries,Inc. v. the United
2
5
States, suggests that a mining company could be compensated for
diminution in the value of its land. Florida Rock purchased a parcel of land
in 1972 in order to extract the underlying limestone.' Investigation
revealed that such a mining operation would destroy the wetlands on the
surface of the property.' The Clean Water Act requires that before an
owner of wetlands engages in any activities that are potentially damaging
to the lands, he must obtain a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers.'
Florida Rock began mining before obtaining a permit, but once it became
aware of the permit requirements, it ceased operations and applied with the
Corps for a permit.' The Corps denied the request.5 7
Florida Rock filed suit, claiming that the denial of the permit was
an uncompensated taking because it deprived the company of all
economically viable use of the property.m The case went through several
stages of litigation, and the Court of Federal Claims decided that a taking
had occurred and that Florida Rock was entitled to $1,029,000 in damages.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
vacated the judgment and remanded for further consideration.'
The Court of Appeals, however, discussed the possibility that
Florida Rock could receive some compensation for the diminishment in the
land's market value. It recognized that a partial taking may have
occurred.' Rather than adopting the point of view that a landowner has
to be completely deprived of the economic use of his property before
compensation is due, this court recognized that an owner should be
compensated
for diminution in land value attributable to a regulatory
61
taking.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

18 F.3d 1560 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 898 (1995).
Id. at 1562.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1563.
Id.
Id. at 1562.
Id. at 1570.
Id. at 1569.
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The dissent in Florida Rock argued that the power of eminent
domain requires a transfer of property to the United States. It then noted
that value is not a transferable interest, so loss of value does not
constitute a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment.' A lengthy
discussion within the dissenting opinion points out the absence of
support for partial takings in case law. Predicting the results of recognizing partial takings as a valid interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, the
dissent stated the following:
If loss of value alone created a claim, Florida Rock not
only would receive the damage award, but also would keep
its land. In effect, takings jurisprudence would become a novel
type of Fifth Amendment tort claim for regulatory injury to
the landowner under which the United States must pay
damages while receiving no quid pro quo.
In Keystone v. Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, a majority of
the Supreme Court rejected mine owners' arguments that the Court
should examine the economic viability of unmined coal, thereby refusing
Chief Justice Rehnquist, however,
to recognize partial takings.64
endorsed the partial takings concept in his dissent.' Although the
partial takings doctrine may at first glance appear to be a viable solution
to the conflict between environmental regulations and private property
owners, if adopted, its effect may be to discourage the government from
passing environmental legislation that may result in land use restrictions.' The Government could be forced to pay land owners for even
small diminutions in property value that regulations cause. Even if the
Court outlined a standard which contained cognizable limitations for
when the Government should have to compensate landowners for loss of
value, the resulting cost to the Government could still be exorbitant.
Legislators would have to consider compensation costs before passing
any regulation affecting land use, which would describe most environmental regulations. Therefore, the partial takings doctrine, while ostensibly
more fair to private property owners, could be highly detrimental to
environmental legislation.
If partial takings is an unsatisfactory solution to be shunned by
environmentalists, what then is to be done about property owners who

62. Id. at 1573.
63. Id. at 1576.
64. Kenneth Berlin, Just Compensation Doctrineand the Workings of Government: The Threat
From the Supreme Court and Possible Responses, 17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 97, 103 (1993).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 104.
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are forced to suffer economic hardship at the hands of environmental
regulations? Clearly, environmentalists cannot ignore property owners.
Developers, ranchers, and oil companies comprise powerful groups that
have the financial wherewithal to strong arm legislators into voting down
environmental laws.
For example, in Flotilla,it was a development corporation that the
ESA detrimentally affected. Oil companies are similarly restricted in their
activities in areas where sea otters are present.67 Ranchers are another
group which has cause to be disgruntled with environmental regulations
and takings law. In Clajon Production Corp. v. Petera,'8 the court denied
Wyoming ranchers and a Texas corporation compensation for a takings
where a state statute allowed hunters onto their land." Thus, by
denying compensation to groups su'h as these, cohesive and financially
well-off groups, the courts are creating strong enemies with political
power to fight environmental legislation.
Given the results of the 1994 congressional election, environmental regulations are already in jeopardy. Political conservatives, who are
generally predisposed towards individual property rights, are labeling the
ESA as an impediment to economic growth and an infringement of
individual property rights.'m Regulatory takings without compensation
provides them support for their arguments.
House Bill 489 is an example of the conservative thrust to reform
takings law in a way which favors property owners." The Act, referred
to as the "Property Rights Litigation Relief Act of 1995," calls for
compensation to landowners when a government action reduces the fair
market value of their property either 10 percent or $10,000 from its value
Moreover, the Act allows
just prior to the government intrusion.'
compensation even when the action results in only a temporary deprivation of the owner's property rights.' According to the bill, the term "just
compensation" means "compensation equal to the full extent of a property
owner's loss, including the fair market value of the private property
taken and business losses arising from a taking, whether the taking is by

Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423, 1427 (10th Cir. 1986).
854 F. Supp. 843 (D. Wyo. 1994).
Id.
Edward Flattau, What Will Congress Do About 'Green' Laws?, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, Jan. 7, 1994, at B7.
71. House Bill 489 was introduced, under the same title, in the Senate as Senate Bill 135.
Also introduced in the Senate was Senate Bill 605, which is titled the "Omnibus Property
Rights Act of 1995." The senate bills are still in committee, and have similar, and in some
cases more extensive, property rights provisions than those in the House Bill.
72. H.R. 489, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(2)(D) (1995).
73. Id. § 5(2)(C).
67.
68.
69.
70.

Winter 1996]

FLORIDA GAME AND FRESH WATER FISH

physical occupation or through regulation, exaction, or other means."'4
In effect, the Act, if passed, would codify the concept of partial takings.
The text of the bill explicitly mentions environmental legislation
as one of the areas the Act is intended to address. "The Federal Government, in its haste to ameliorate public harms and environmental abuse,
has singled out property holders to shoulder the cost that should be
borne by the public, in violation of the just compensation requirement of
the takings clause of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution."75 Thus, takings in the context of government regulations, and more
specifically, environmental regulations, is a worry of political conservatives. This Act is proof that takings law is providing support for a
backlash against environmental legislation.
Kenneth Berlin recognizes a similar sentiment among activist
conservative legal scholars. 76 These conservative scholars believe that
"government actions restricting property rights require compensation
regardless of the beneficial impact of the regulation or the harmful impact
on the community or the environment that the activity causes." Berlin
notes that such an approach "could make the cost of operating government so great that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to implement
most economic, land use and environmental regulations."'
B. Positive Incentives
Some critics of environmental legislation, and of the ESA in
particular, believe that compensating property owners is essential to
promote cooperation with respect to environmental legislation.' In
addition, one suggestion is that environmental regulations also provide
positive incentives for landowners who agree to protect endangered
species habitat.' An example is Defenders of Wildlife's offer, as a part
of its plan to reintroduce the grey wolf in Montana and Wyoming, to pay
landowners for each litter of wolves they raise on their property.81 These
types of incentives would, however, become very costly for the Government. There is an attitude that taxpayers, particularly urban taxpayers
who are not as directly affected by environmental regulations, should

74. Id. § 4(3)(A).

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. § 2(5).
Berlin, supra note 64,
Berlin, supra note 64,
Berlin, supra note 64,
Berlin, supra note 64,
Berlin, supra note 64,
Berlin, supra note 64,

at 97.
at 98.
at 98.
at 75.
at 77.
at 77.
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recognize the value of wildlife and be willing to support its preservation
through taxes.&
This view, although justifiable, is somewhat naive. While it seems
only fair and logical that the public should have to collectively bear the
burden of preserving wildlife and the environment, counting on
taxpayers to support the increased costs of such legislation resulting from
a more liberal compensation policy and positive incentives could be a
mistake. Most Americans would probably agree that the government
should support efforts to protect the environment, but when those efforts
force them to reach deeper into their pockets, their response may be
slightly different. Moreover, the fate of costly environmental regulations
could be closely tied to the state of the economy. In periods of economic
growth, taxpayers may be generous in their support, and in periods of
recession, environmental legislation could go by the wayside. That is not
to say that American taxpayers are greedy, or unwilling to put environmental concerns above their own financial status. Indeed, many may
support legislation which protects the environment, but oppose such
legislation due to their own financial concerns.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Flotillademonstrates the tension between imposing restrictions on
landowners to protect the environment and compensating those
landowners pursuant to the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. The case
is particularly interesting because Flotilla could not have foreseen or
planned for the buffer zones on its land because of the temporary nature
of the eagles' presence. Although Flotilla was eventually able to develop
and sell its land, it nevertheless suffered financially because of the delays
the restrictions created. Flotilla's situation illustrates how a relatively
minor restriction to a developer's use of its land can still cause the
landowner economic hardship, and how that developer has no real
recourse for regaining its losses.
Recent proposals for *reform in the takings area strongly support
compensation for diminution in value of a landowners property due to
environmental restrictions. These proposals tend to reflect a backlash
against environmental regulations. While the legislation is more fair to
property owners, its almost certain side-effect is to make environmental
regulations financially burdensome.
Thus, it seems that, currently, there is no satisfactory balance
between compensating landowners and passing forceful, and financially
manageable legislation. Landowners, as witnessed by the current wave

82. Berlin, supra note 64, at 77.
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of "property rights" legislation, already feel alienated from the environmental movement. If environmentalists are going to curtail habitat-threatening development, however, they must present their own reforms in this
area, which are designed to ameliorate the hostility of landowners to
restrictions on their property rights. Although environmental regulations
have sometimes compromised private property rights the outlook for
such regulations is not without hope since "95 percent of the cases
involving some land use adjustments to safeguard an endangered species
are resolved without any confrontation over.., the sanctity of private
property rights."8
Holly R. Harvey

83. Flattau, supra note 70.

